
PRESENTED 



NTED By| / Q Qv* 



THEWARAIMSOFTHE 
UNITED STATES 

A STUDY OUTLINE 

BY 

Lindsay Rogers 



THE FEDERATION OF INTERNATIONAL POLITY CLUBS 

EDITORIAL OFFICES: 407 WEST I I 7TH STREET 

NEW YORK CITY 



I 






Copyright, 191 8 
By Lindsay Rogers 



. 



CONTENTS 

Introduction 3 

A . War Aims 5 

B. Why Discuss War Aims? 8 

C. The United States and the Settlement 11 

D. President Wilson's Diplomacy 13 

E. President Wilson's War Aims 16 

1 . Open diplomacy 16 

2. Freedom of the seas 21 

3. Equality of trade conditions 26 

4. Reduction of armaments 30 

5. Adjustment of colonial claims 32 

6. Russia 35 

7. Belgium 36 

8. Alsace-Lorraine 40 

9- Italy 43 

10. Austria-Hungary 46 

1 1 . The Balkans 48 

12. Turkey 50 

13. Poland 51 

14. A League of Nations ^2 



Digitized by the Internet Archive 
in 2011 with funding from 
The Library of Congress 



http://www.archive.org/details/waraimsofuniteds01roge 



THE WAR AIMS OF THE UNITED STATES 

A STUDY OUTLINE 

The settlement after the war, whenever and however it may 
come is bound to be concerned with problems of fundamental 
importance that will, as Mr. Lloyd George has said, "settle 
the destiny of nations, the course of human life for God knows 
how many ages." Among these abstract problems will be the 
nature and functions of the state; the use of arbitration; the 
system of alliances and the groupings of the powers; the 
alleged rivalry of nations and the chances for a League of 
States; the competition of armaments and their limitation; 
diplomacy and its defects; the effects of absolutism and 
democracy upon national policies; the principle of nationality; 
the use of plebiscites; the value of international guarantees; 
the validity of treaties ; possible changes in and a sanction for 
international law; the advisability of increasing the number 
of permanently neutralized states; the value of indemnities; 
the government of subject races by international commissions, 
and the relation of politics to economics and both to strategy. 
The application of these general principles to concrete situa- 
tions will raise many questions of stupendous importance. 

Already the books published on the war and its issues num- 
ber thousands ; only the specialist can be even partially famil- 
iar with the vast amount of material on war aims and peace 
terms, and for the student who desires to be informed upon the 
problems that will have to be solved at the settlement, some 
apparatus is desirable, if not necessary, to enable him to use the 
existing material. Magazine articles and pamphlets can deal 
with but single points; a few comprehensive books of great 
value have been published, but for a more than cursory read- 
ing, the hotly debated questions must be oriented and different 
views indicated. 

This study outline has been prepared to meet this need. In 
its general plan it follows and in some cases quotes from, al- 

3 



though it is more elaborate than, those issued by the English 
Council for the Study of International Relations and the 
League of Nations Society. As would seem natural it is based 
upon President Wilson's programme (January 8, 1918) of the 
fourteen international adjustments which, in his opinion, must 
be considered when the settlement is arranged. After some 
general suggestions concerning the discussion of war aims and 
peace terms before victory is secured, these fourteen points are 
annotated. 

A few books will be found of chief interest. The War and 
Democracy (Macmillan) and International Relations (Mac- 
millan), by various English writers, give an admirable survey 
of the issues of the war. C. Ernest Fayle, The Great Settlement 
(Duffield), H. N. Brailsford, A League of Nations (Macmillan), 
A. J. Toynbee, Nationality and the War (Dutton) have con- 
sidered most of the problems of the settlement and have 
written with great interest and effect. Mr. Brailsford's book 
is especially good and although arguing strongly for a League 
of Nations, does not make the blunder of American authors 
— for example, Goldsmith, A League to Enforce Peace (Mac- 
millan)— in minimizing the severe tests to which a League will 
be put if it is called upon to settle existing or possible concrete 
questions of European politics. A great deal of valuable 
material is also to be found in The New Europe (Constable) , a 
young English weekly review that is now being widely read. 
The other books and articles referred to are for the most part 
easily accessible. It was not intended that the opinions of 
the writer should appear in this study outline. If they do he 
alone is responsible. 

University of Virginia. L. R. 



A. WAR AIMS 

Before December, 191 6, there was not much discussion of 
peace. War aims had been fully presented in the diplomatic 
correspondence published by the belligerents and in the 
speeches of statesmen who frequently took notice of what had 
been said by the enemy (e.g., von Bethmann-Hollweg, April 5, 
1916, Mr. Asquith, April 10, 1916, Current History, May, 
1916, pp. 228, 231, and von Bethmann-Hollweg, November 9, 
1916, Current History, February, 1917, p. 867). These docu- 
ments and speeches are readily accessible in a variety of forms. 

There were, of course, many rumors, semi-official "feelers," 
and individual discussions of peace. On the first anniversary 
of the war the Pope issued an appeal to the belligerents, but 
it was little more than an eulogy of peace in the abstract (Cur- 
rent History, September, 1915, p. 1022) ; in his submarine note 
of May 4, 1916, von Jagow, German Secretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs, said: 

The German Government, conscious of Germany's strength, twice 
[December 9, 1915, April 5, 1916 ?] within the last few months an- 
nounced before the world its readiness to make peace on terms safe- 
guarding Germany's vital interests, thus indicating that it is not 
Germany's fault if peace is still withheld from the nations of Europe. 
(Note of May 4, 1916, Current History, June 1916, p. 455.) 

and on May 27th, speaking to the League to Enforce Peace 
President Wilson made a formal statement of his willingness to 
mediate : 

If it should ever be our privilege to suggest or initiate a movement 
for peace among the nations now at war, I am sure that the people 
of the United States would wish their Government to move along 
these lines: 

First. Such a settlement with regard to their immediate interests 
as the belligerents may agree upon. We have nothing material of any 
kind to ask for ourselves, and are quite aware that we are in no sense 
or degree parties to the present quarrel. Our interest is only in peace 
and its future guarantees. 






Second. A universal association of the nations to maintain the 
inviolate security of the highway of the seas for the common and 
unhindered use of all the nations of the world, and to prevent any war, 
begun either contrary to treaty covenants or without warning and full 
submission of the causes to the opinion of the world — a virtual guar- 
antee of territorial integrity and political independence. {Current 
History, July, 1916, p. 736). 

Mr. Wilson had previously made a formal offer of mediation 
(August 5,1914) that was courteously declined. In September, 
1914, Ambassador Gerard reported to President Wilson the 
views of the Imperial Chancellor, von Bethmann-Hollweg, that 

Germany was appreciative of the American Government's interest 
and offer of services in trying to make peace 

but that in view of the treaty pledging the Allies against any 
separate cessation of hostilities, 

The United States ought to get proposals of peace from the Allies. 
Germany could accept only a lasting peace, one that would make her 
people secure against future attacks. To accept mediation now would 
be interpreted by the Allies as a sign of weakness on the part of Ger- 
many and would be misunderstood by the German people, who, having 
made great sacrifices, had the right to demand guarantees of security. 
{Current History, December, 1914, p. 273). 

But so far as ever disclosed the overtures had no more definite 
result. 

The real discussion of peace terms began with Germany's 
offer of December 12, 1916, the Allied reply to it, and the 
interchanges over President Wilson's note of December 18, 
1916, calling for a statement of war aims. These communica- 
tions are published in Current History, in International Concili- 
ation, Nos. 1 10 and 1 1 i T and with supplementary documents by 
the Division of International Law of the Carnegie Endowment 
for International Peace (Official Communications and Speeches 
Relating to Peace Proposals, iqi6-iqi'/'. Pamphlet No. 23). 
President Wilson's address to the Senate on January 22, 1917 
and his address to Congress (February 3) on the breaking of 
diplomatic relations will be found in this last named collection, 
while the armed neutrality address (February 26), that of 
April 2 asking for a declaration of war, the Flag Day Address 

6 



(June 14), and the communications to Russia in May and 
June have either been issued by the Committee on Public In- 
formation, or are in Current History. (See also, 'The Entry of 
the United States', International Conciliation, No. 114). The 
Pope's peace proposal and the replies are printed in Interna- 
tional Conciliation No. 119. During the year, of course, there 
were a number of important speeches by British and French 
statesmen. 

In December, 19 17, there began another important "peace 
offensive" brought about by the negotiations with Russia; the 
declaration of British Labor's War Aims (December 28) ; 
Mr. Lloyd George's speech (January 5) ; President Wilson's 
message to Congress (January 8) ; the replies of Count Hertling 
and Count Czernin (January 24) ; the President's rejoinder 
addressed principally to Austria (February 11), and Mr. Lloyd 
George's and Mr. Asquith's speeches the next day. This 
enumeration does not include such important communications 
as those of President Eliot or Lord Lansdowne's letters to the 
Daily Telegraph. All of these can be found in Current History. 
See also, International Conciliation , Nos. 122 and 123. 



B. WHY DISCUSS WAR AIMS? 

An argument for a full disclosure of the purposes for which 
armaments will be used is to be found in Norman Angell's The 
Dangers of Half-Preparedness (Putnam, 1916); and the best 
case for a diplomatic as well as a military offensive is made out 
in Mr. Angell's last book, War Aims: The Need for a Parlia- 
ment of the Allies (Headley Bros., 191 7) some of which appeared 
in The New Republic and the argument of which is substan- 
tially similar to the position taken editorially by The New 
Republic and The Nation (London). 

Mr. Angell says: 

The recommendations of the Paris Conference constitute an ad- 
mission that, however complete our military victory, Germany will 
remain a great potential military, political, and economic factor in 
international relations. 

Have we, then, any clear picture of the conditions which we are 
trying to establish? Does the "destruction of Prussian Militarism" 
mean that Germany is to have no army as well as no navy? If she is 
to have an army, is its size to bear some relation to the size of other 
armies? If so, what is to be the ratio? And, when we demand the 
destruction of her military forces, are we to offer Germany no guar- 
antee against outrageous demand, or attacks upon her by other 
Powers? 

Until we have some notion, at least, of these things, we can- 
not pretend to know what the destruction of German Militarism 
means . . . . 

The announcement of a plan of guarantees by a new Paris Confer- 
ence, which would truly represent all the great nations of the world, 
outside of Germany and Austria, if made during the war, would be a 
powerful, perhaps determining, factor in undermining the military 
resistance of the German people to the aims of the Allies, since it would 
make it apparent that those aims offer the best security for the rights 
and existence of the Germans themselves; and such an announcement 
would constitute the best means of aiding a revolt of German sentiment 
against militarist philosophy and German Militarism. (Angell, War 
Aims, pp. 55, 1 1 8-1 19.) 



As illustrating Mr. Angell's contentions, the following inci- 
dent may be cited : 

On December 14, Mr. Lloyd George in an address at Gray's 
Inn, made a strong speech in which little was said about any 
war aims except victory. Count Herding, the Imperial Chan- 
cellor, immediately granted an interview to the Wolff Bureau, 
the German semi-official news agency, in which he declared: 

In his last speech Mr. Lloyd George calls us criminals and bandits. 
As it has already once been declared in the Reichstag, we do not intend 
to join in this renewal of the customs of the Homeric heroes. Modern 
wars are not won by invective, but are rather, perhaps, prolonged, 
because after this abuse by the English Prime Minister it is out of the 
question for us to negotiate with men of such temper . 

Just over a year has passed since we and our Allies offered the enemy 
the hand of peace. It was rejected. Meanwhile our reply to the Papal 
Note has again set forth our standpoint. At this moment when I have 
just received news that the truce which already existed between us 
and our Eastern neighbors has passed into a formal armistice, the 
speech of the British Prime Minister is before me. It is the answer of 
the present British Cabinet to the Papal Note. Our way in the West 
is accordingly clear. (London Times [weekly edition], December 
21, I917.) 

A view contrary to that of Mr. Angell : 

The truth is that all discussion of war aims, in advance of the sal- 
vation of the world from the German menace, amounts merely to 
words. If Germany wins the war, her aims will prevail and we know 
what they are. The Bolsheviki, who have long thundered against 
Allied war aims, have reduced Russia to impotence only to discover 
that Germany demands of them all the Russian territory she has con- 
quered by force of arms during the war, and a mortgage on the economic 
future of Russia in addition. Those who are seeking to promote the 
same disorder in Allied nations would find Germany demanding 
Belgium and the North of France, once France and Britain were 
weakened by internal dissensions. 

When real peace terms are to be made, we in the United States will be 
able to speak a powerful word for justice and against aggrandizements 
which promise not real peace but new wars. But until there is prospect 
of any but German terms, which we must all fight, there is no object 
and there is real danger in the discussion, which is encouraged and in- 
duced in no small measure by German agents all over the world. (Frank 
H. Simonds, 'The Fifth Campaign'. Review of.Reviezvs, January, 191S.) 

9 



Is the interchange of views of statesmen in the war (very 
free in comparison with previous discussions) to be attributed 
to an acceptance of Mr. Angell's position or to a desire to 
secure the support of public opinion? 

How far should the Allies go in stating publicly the terms 
that they will insist upon at the settlement? 

Is there danger in inconsistency between peace terms as 
expressed by the Allied statesmen? (e.g., President Wilson's 
address to Congress, February n, 1918, on Austria and the 
position taken by Mr. Lloyd George?) 

How far should the disclosure and discussion of peace terms 
be checked because it serves to divide the Allies and hearten 
pacifists? 

Can Prussian militarism ever be finally destroyed until the 
German people have experienced a change of heart and have 
rebelled against its philosophy? 

Can this change of heart come so long as the German people 
believe that they must fight for this philosophy in order to 
protect themselves, or be ready to fight in order to protect 
themselves after the settlement? 

How far should the people through Parliamentary repre- 
sentatives, Socialist and Labor organizations, participate in a 
discussion of the settlement? 



10 



C. THE UNITED STATES AND THE SETTLEMENT 

The United States is not a party to the treaty, signed at 
London, September 5, 1914, pledging Great Britain, France 
and Russia not to conclude peace separately and promising 
"that when terms of peace come to be discussed no one of the 
Allies will demand terms of peace without the previous agree- 
ment of each of the other Allies." (See Current History, 
December 8, 1914, p. 297.) Japan later acceded to the treaty. 
Semi-officially it is stated that the United States looks on the 
Entente Powers as "co-belligerents" rather than "allies"; that 
there is a "gentleman's agreement" rather than a formal 
document. 

Every one of the nations at war with Germany took up 
arms for some specific reason that can be briefly, if incom- 
pletely, stated: Russia to save Serbia; Italy to secure terri- 
tory from Austria, partly for the latter country's breach of 
the terms of the Triple Alliance; Great Britain to defend 
Belgium and protect France; Belgium, France, and Serbia 
to protect themselves. The use of the submarine against 
merchant vessels was the one offense that served to associate 
the United States with the Entente nations. But as Viscount 
Grey has said : 

Militarism stands for things that all democracies, if they wish to 
remain free and to be part of a world that is free, must hate. This 
conviction and a sense that the old barriers of the world are broken 
down by modern conditions, that the cause of humanity is one, and 
that no nation so great and free as the United States could stand aside 
in this crisis without sacrificing its honor and losing its soul, are — so we 
believe — the real motive and cause of the decision of the United States. 
Democracies are reluctant to take such decisions until they are attacked 
or until their own material interests are directly and deeply involved, 
and the United States did not take the decision till German action in 
the War made it imperative; but then they took it with a clearness, 
and emphasis, and a declaration of principle that will be one of the 
landmarks and shining examples of all human history. (The Rt. Hon. 



Viscount Grey, America and Freedom [Preface], p. iv. [Allen & UnwinJ; 
reprinted, International Conciliation, No. 120, November, 1917, p. 24.) 
(President Wilson's series of addresses to Congress, February 3 and 26 
and April 2, 1917, should be read in this connection.) 

How far did the United States, by entering the war, approve 
the war aims of the Allies as expressed in the replies to the 
German note (December, 1916) and President Wilson's note? 
Compare the views expressed by the Allies and Mr. Wilson. 

Would the United States be justified, as a late comer into 
the war, owing much to England and France for keeping 
Germany at bay for more than two years, in using her influ- 
ence against the realization of certain war aims generally said to 
be fundamental, e. g., the return of Alsace-Lorraine to France? 

How far can the United States claim the right to be con- 
sulted on war aims covered by the formula "restitution and 
reparation?" 

How far are the war aims of the Allies inconsistent with 
Mr. Wilson's more recent formula (February 11, 1918)? How 
far is the United States bound to support readjustments which 
go farther than merely inaugurating a League of Nations as 
one form of international insurance? 

Should the United States be a party to all phases of the 
settlement, even those that do not remotely concern her by 
menacing her security in the future? 



D. PRESIDENT WILSON'S DIPLOMACY 

I. President Wilson's attempt to create a rift between the 
German military party on the one hand and the German 
people and Austria-Hungary on the other is his distinctive 
contribution to the diplomacy of the Allies. An appeal to 
democratic elements in Germany is particularly made in the 
reply to the Pope but appears in all of Mr. Wilson's utterances 
on^the war; the same appeal to Austria-Hungary to free 
herself from Prussian domination is the basis of the address to 
Congress asking for a declaration of war against Austria 
(Current History, January, 191 8, p. 63) and the address on 
Count Czernin's speech (February 11, 191 8; see below, E.) 
The distinction between the Germans and their government is 
officially echoed to some small extent in England by Mr. 
Balfour's phrase that Germany must either become powerless 
or free and by Mr. Lloyd George's recent speeches which 
imply that more moderate terms could be made with a democ- 
ratized Germany. The various declarations of the British 
Labor Party are more explicit. (See President Wilson's Flag 
Day speech, June 14, 1917, Current History, July, 1917, p. 1, 
and the British Labor Platform, Current History, February, 
1918, p. 200; also International Conciliation No. 123.) 

At Buffalo (November 13, 191 7), addressing the American 
Federation of Labor, Mr. Wilson went out of his way to pay 
a tribute to the German people: 

I believe that the spirit of freedom can get into the hearts of Germans 
and find as fine a welcome there as it can find in any other hearts, but 
the spirit of freedom does not suit the plans of the Pan-Germans. 
{Current History, December, 1917, p. 441.) 

The theoretical distinction between the German Government and 
the German People is sound enough, but we cannot help thinking that 
up to the present it has proved quite negligible in practice. Wilson is 
right in a sense when he says that the German people "did not choose 
the War." They did not choose it because, under the Bismarckian 
Constitution, they have no choice at all in such high matters, but they 

13 



accepted it with enthusiasm. They have given it throughout their 
active support. Their representatives have voted with unanimity 
supplies for its continuance. {The London Times, commenting on 
President Wilson's reply to the Pope; see also, Brig. Gen. F. G. Stone, 
'At War with the German People', Nineteenth Century, August, 
1917.) 

Admitting the correctness of the position here taken, does 
it lessen the chances for success of Mr. Wilson's policy? What 
are the chances for the success of such a policy? 

When Mr. Wilson distinguishes between the German 
Government and the German people is he calling attention 
to an actual fact or is he simply looking toward the future? 

Would a Germany "free" be a lesser menace to the future 
peace of the world than a Germany "powerless?" 

Would a Germany in which the people had an effective con- 
trol over foreign policy, the army, and the navy likely be "im- 
perialistic" or "militaristic?" 

Can the Prussian military domination be utterly and finally 
destroyed — a frequently reiterated Entente war aim — until the 
German people insist upon its being destroyed? 

The following books may be found of some help: Ackerman, 
Germany, the Next Republic (Doran) ; Fernau, The Coming 
Democracy (Dutton) ; Liebknecht, Militarism (Huebsch) ; 
Gerard, My Four Years in Germany (Doran) ; Curtin, The 
Land of Deepening Shadow (Doran) ; and Beer, The English 
Speaking Peoples (Macmillan), p. 129. 

II. Mr. Wilson is also very largely responsible for the fact 
that the discussion of war aims is public, not secret. In his 
own phrase: 

The thought of the plain people here and everywhere throughout 
the world, the people who enjoy privilege and have very simple and 
unsophisticated standards of right and wrong, is the air all Govern- 
ments must henceforth breathe if they would live. It is in the full 
disclosing light of that thought that all policies must be conceived and 
executed in the midday hour of the world's life. (Address to Congress, 
December 4, 1917.) 

How far did Mr. Wilson's note of December 22, 1916, calling 
for a statement of war aims from all the belligerents, strengthen 

14 



the diplomatic position of the Entente Allies and force the 
hand of Germany? 

How far have Mr. Wilson's utterances since the United 
States entered the war — for example his message to Russia 
(May 26, 191 8 ; Current History, July, p. 49) — influenced Allied 
diplomacy? 

Are the so-called German "peace offensives" — with their use 
of diplomacy as the hand-maiden of military offensives — in 
consonance with the quotation from Mr. Wilson's December 
(191 7) message? 

BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Aceerman, Germany, the Next Republic (Doran) . 
Beer, The English Speaking Peoples (Macmillan). 
Curtin, The Land of Deepening Shadow (Doran). 
Fernau, The Coming Democracy (Dutton). 
Gerard, My Four Years in Germany (Doran). 
Liebknecht, Militarism (Huebsch). 

Current History. 

Nineteenth Century and After. 



15 



E. PRESIDENT WILSON'S WAR AIMS 

I. Open covenants of peace, openly arrived at, after which 
there shall be no private international u?ider standings of any 
kind but diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and in the 
public view. 

Who, then, makes war? The answer is to be found in the chancel- 
leries of Europe among the men who have too long played with human 
lives as pawns in a game of chess, who have become so enmeshed in 
formulae and the jargon of diplomacy that they have ceased to be 
conscious of the poignant realities with which they trifle. And thus 
war will continue to be made until the great masses who are the support 
of professional schemers and dreamers say the word which shall bring 
not eternal peace, for that is impossible, but a determination that war 
shall be fought only in a just and righteous cause. (The London Times, 
November 23, 191 2). 

For illustrations of how some wars have been brought about 
see Cambridge Modern History, vol. XII., chap. 16; 'Diplo- 
matist', Nationalism and War in the Near East (Oxford), pp. 
177, 230; Fernau, Because I Am- a German (Dutton), p. 144; 
and Dickinson, The Choice Before Us (Dodd, Mead), p. 248. 

To what extent does the quotation from The Times describe 
the true state of affairs? 

How far can it be said that "secret diplomacy" is responsible 
for the present war? 

See Ponsonby, Democracy and Diplomacy (Methuen) ; 
Ponsonby, 'Democracy and Publicity in Foreign Affairs' in 
Towards a Lasting Settlement (Macmillan) ; Neilson, How 
Diplomats Make War (Huebsch); Morel, Ten Years of Secret 
Diplomacy (Labor Press); Dickinson, 'Democratic Control of 
Foreign Policy', Atlantic Monthly, August, 1916; Bullard, 
'Democracy and Diplomacy', Atlantic Monthly, April, 1 9 1 7 ; 
Macdonell, 'Secret or Constructive Diplomacy', Contemporary 
Review, June, 1916; Brown 'Democracy and Diplomacy', 
North American Review, November, 1916; Hyndman, 'Eng- 

16 



land's Secret Diplomacy', North American Review, May, 1916; 
Turner, 'Control of Diplomacy', The Nation (N. Y.), June 
8, 1916. 

In November, 191 6, Lord Robert Cecil, debating the Greek 
situation said: 

We are perfectly conscious of the many mistakes we make, of the 
many deficiencies of which we are guilty, but I cannot believe that 
anything which waters down the responsibility of the Government is 
likely to improve it. We must do what we think right. We must 
carry on the government of the country, badly I agree, but as well as 
we can do it, and we cannot share that responsibility with the House 
of Commons or with anybody else — not during the war. That seems 
to me the only position Ave can take up. 

The only English paper to comment on this was the Manchester 
Guardian which declared (November 2, 1916) that Parliament 
had less control than the War Committee of the French Cham- 
ber and Senate, or the Budget Committee of the Reichstag. 

All that is open to Parliament is to put questions, which if they are 
really pertinent are likely to meet with impertinent answers; or to 
initiate on the Foreign Office vote a discussion which will range over 
every topic under the sun that can be associated with the Foreign 
Secretaiy and which is as ineffective as it is discursive. {The New 
Etirope, November 9, 1916.) 

I think there is in the public mind a profound illusion as to this so- 
called secret diplomacy. Secret diplomacy is not, as I have tried to 
explain, a criminal operation intended to cover up dark transactions 
which lead to division among mankind; it is merely the practice of 
ordinary beings in the ordinary course of life which they conduct to 
the best of their ability and under the ordinary rules governing private 
individuals in the doing of such work as they have got to do. It is an 
extension of that to the intercourse between nations and I do not believe 
the rules governing the two are fundamentally different, although 
luckily in private life we do not always have to issue subsequently 
Blue Books explaining and recording all the letters which have passed 
between controversialists, or giving all the reasons which produced 
unhappy differences of opinion in the domestic circle. (Mr. Balfour 
in the House of Commons, August 17, 1917.) 

Discuss the issues raised in these quotations. 
Should there be a Foreign Affairs Committee in England to 
hear ministers on the conduct of foreign affairs? 

17 



What are the present arrangements of European countries 
and the United States for treating international questions? 
(See text-books on government — the subject has been dis- 
cussed by eminent authorities like Bagehot, Bryce, Sidgwick, 
etc. — and the Appendices in Ponsonby, Democracy and Dip- 
lomacy, giving extracts from a Parliamentary paper describing 
different systems of controlling international affairs — Mis- 
cellaneous, No. 5, 1912, Cd. 6102.) 

Does the arrangement in the United States — i. e., the con- 
currence of the Senate in treaties- — insure that, in Mr. Wilson's 
phrase, "diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and in the 
public view?" 

Cf. Corwin, The President'' s Control over Foreign Relations 
(Princeton University Press); Wriston, 'Presidential Special 
Agents in Diplomacy', American Political Science Review, 
August, 1916; President Wilson's Missions to Europe; his 
exchanges with Bernstorff and Germany in the submarine 
controversy; the negotiations preceding the acquisition of 
the Virgin Islands (Danish West Indies), and the Lansing- 
Ishii agreement. 

It is against secret poticies in which the national liability may be 
unlimited that the only genuine protest can be raised; for such policies 
are the very negative of democracy and the denial of the most funda- 
mental of all popular rights, namely that the citizen shall know on 
what terms his country may ask him to lay down his life. This justi- 
fication of popular control does not presuppose the publication of 
diplomatic negotiations. On the contrary, it rests on the assumption 
that the People and Parliament will know where to draw the line 
between necessary control in matters of principle and the equally 
necessary discretionary freedom of the expert in negotiation. (A. F. 
Whyte, The New Europe, August 23, 1917.) 

Is this test a valid and sufficient one? 

Was England's entrance into the war contrary to the prin- 
ciple here set forth? 

Is it advisable that there be alignments according to po- 
litical parties on questions of foreign politics? 

How far is a more democratic diplomacy dependent upon re- 
cruiting the diplomatic service from men who are in touch with 
what the masses in their country are thinking and wanting? 

18 



Have improved means of communication made this con- 
sideration of less importance? 

Is the United States with its "shirt sleeve" diplomacy the 
superior of England in this respect? 

See MacNeill, Parliament and Foreign Policy (Council for 
the Study of International Relations) ; The Foreign Office and 
the Foreign Service Abroad {Ibid.); Satow, A Guide to Diplo- 
matic Practice (Longmans) ; Ponsonby, Democracy and Dip- 
lomacy; and especially, A. F. Whyte, 'A Note on Diplomacy', 
The New Europe, May 3, 191 7 and succeeding discussions in 
this journal of a new school for diplomats. 

And so it was with something like stupefaction that they [the 
English people] discovered, one day in August, that they were called 
upon to honour the obligations contracted in their name. {The War 
and Democracy, p. 3.) 

Was the surprise referred to a proof that the Government of 
the United Kingdom was undemocratic or a proof that the 
great mass of people had overlooked a duty of citizenship by 
neglecting the study of foreign relations? 

Was anyone who had made a study of British foreign policy 
(from materials accessible to all) surprised at the British Gov- 
ernment's taking the course it did in July and August, 1914? 

That the people of Europe have, in fact, even in countries otherwise 
democratic, no control over foreign policy will hardly be disputed. 
But the question remains, how does this come about? In detail, the 
answer will be dififerent in different countries, according to the details 
of constitutional machinery and parliamentary procedure. But one 
fundamental fact applies generally. The people in no country have 
cared to know or control. In England, and no doubt in other countries, 
it is plainly true that the advent of democracy has meant, so far, not 
more but less interest in foreign policy. 

But, after all, in the English system any matter can be made public 
and brought under control, if the people are determined to do it. And 
in England it must be admitted that, if this has not been done, it is 
because the people have not cared to do it. A Foreign Secretary would 
have had to give information, if it had been made clear that otherwise 
there would be a vote of censure. And improvements in the machinery 
of our parliamentary government, useful and necessary as they may 
be, will not ensure democratic control unless the people are determined 
to have it. Will they be determined? I cannot say. But after the 

19 



experience of this war, it does not seem likely that they will revert to 
the illusion that foreign policy does not concern them. (Dickinson, 
The Choice Before Us, pp. 243-244.) 

Do you agree with this estimate that an increase in educa- 
tion is more important than an improvement in machinery, at 
least so far as England is concerned? 

See Sir Gilbert Murray, 'Democratic Control of Foreign 
Policy', Contemporary Review, February, 1916 (also chapter VI 
in his Faith, War, and Policy (Houghton, Mifflin) ; The War 
and Democracy, chapters I and VI, and Rogers, 'Popular Con- 
trol of Foreign Policy', Sewanee Review, October, 1916 (also 
published at The Hague by the Central Organization for a 
Durable Peace in Recueil des Rapports de V Organization Centrale 
pour une Paix durable. 

How do you account for the fact that the American people 
are less interested in foreign politics than in domestic prob- 
lems? What is the remedy? 

Can public opinion influence foreign policy more effectively 
in the United States than in France or England? 

Should a statesman, like the British Prime Minister or the 
President of the United States act 

(a) as he thinks the public at the moment wishes the country 
to act, or 

(b) as he thinks the public would wish the country to act if 
they knew and took into account all the facts of the situa- 
tion in his possession, or 

(c) as he thinks himself the country ought to act? 

What course do you think President Wilson has followed? 

Are any modifications in our treaty-making arrangements 
or administration of the President's power over foreign affairs 
necessary in order to have a more popular control over foreign 
policy? 

BIBLIOGRArilY 

Corwin, The President's Control over Foreign Relations (Princeton 

University Press). 
Dickinson, The Choice Before Us (Dodd, Mead). 
'Diplomatist', Nationalism and War in the Near East (Oxford). 
Fernau, Because I am a German (Dutton). 



Morel, Ten Years of Secret Diplomacy (Labor Press). 
Murray, Faith, War and Policy (Houghton, Mifflin). 
Neilson, How Diplomats Make War (Huebsch). 
Ponsonby, Democracy and Diplomacy (Methuen). 
Satow, A Guide to Diplomatic Practice (Longmans). 
Cambridge Modern History, Vol. XII. 
Towards a Lasting Settlement (Macmillan). 
The War and Democracy (Macmillan). 

American Political Science Review. 

Atlantic Monthly. 

Contemporary Review. 

Council for Study of International Relations. 

North American Review. 

The Nation (New York). 

The New Europe. 

Sewanee Review. 



II. Absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas, outside ter- 
ritorial waters, alike in peace and in war, except as the seas 
may be closed in whole or in part by international action for the 
enforcement of international covenants. 

The "freedom of the seas" has apparently given Germany 
great concern. It is stressed by von Bethman-Hollvveg in his 
speech of November 9, 1916; it is included in the proposals for 
peace communicated to American newspapers, April 18, 191 5 
by Dr. Bernhard Dernburg: "The world is one interlocking 
family of nations. World dominion is possible only with 
dominion on high seas. All the seas and narrows must be 
neutralized permanently by common and effective agreement 
guaranteed by the. Powers." (Toward an Enduring Peace, 

P- I34-) 

Exactly what does Germany mean by her insistence on the 
"freedom of the seas?" 

Would Germany herself consider at the settlement that 
anything could be done to make the seas freer in time of peace 
than they were at the beginning of the war? 

Is it true that the discussion about freedom of the seas 
narrows to the question of restriction on trade between 
belligerents and neutrals in time of war? 



"Freedom of the seas" figured prominently in the exchanges 
between the United States and Germany over the submarine; 
President Wilson referred to it several times ineaddresses while 
the United States was a neutral: 

If the United States were permitted to initiate or assist in a move- 
ment for peace it would urge "a universal association of the nations to 
maintain the inviolate security of the highway of the seas for the com- 
mon and unhindered use of all the nations of the world ..." 
(At a banquet of the League to Enforce Peace, May 22, 1916.) 

And the paths of the sea must alike in law and in fact be free. The 
freedom of the seas is the sine qua non of peace, equality, and coopera- 
tion. No doubt a somewhat radical reconsideration of many of the 
rules of international practice hitherto thought to be established may 
be necessary in order to make the seas indeed free and common in 
practically all circumstances for the use of mankind, but the motive 
for such changes is convincing and compelling. There can be no trust 
or intimacy between the peoples of the world without them. The free, 
constant, unthreatened intercourse of nations is an essential part of 
the process of peace and development. It need not be difficult either 
to define or to secure the freedom of the seas if the governments of the 
world sincerely desire to come to an agreement concerning it. 

It is a problem closely connected with the limitation of naval arma- 
ments and the cooperation of the navies of the world in keeping the 
seas at once free and safe. (Address to the Senate, January 22, 1917.) 

What is the connection between the freedom of the seas as 
advocated by Mr. Wilson and the position of the United 
States that private property should be immune from naval 
capture? 

(Cf. Mr. Wilson's proposal and the suggestion of the Cen- 
tral Organization for a Durable Peace that "to facilitate the 
reduction of naval armaments the right of capture will be 
abolished and the freedom of the sea assured." For the 'Mini- 
mum Programme' of the Central Organization, see Woolf, The 
Framework of a Lasting Peace [Allen & Unwin], p. 63, and 
Andrews, 'The Central Organization for a Durable Peace', 
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 
July, 1916, p. 16.) 

As the United States has for many years advocated the exemption 
of all private property not contraband of war from hostile treatment, 
you are authorized to propose to the Conference the principle of ex- 



tending to strictly private property at sea the immunity from destruc- 
tion or capture by belligerent powers which such property already 
enjoys on land as worthy of being incorporated in the permanent law 
of civilized nations. (Instructions to the American delegates to the 
First Hague Peace Conference.) 

For the efforts of the United States in support of this pro- 
posal, before 1899 and at the Hague Conferences, and for the 
policy of such a departure as affecting the interests of the 
United States and Great Britain, see 'Cosmos', The Basis of 
Durable Peace (Scribner), p. 29 ff. ; Scott, The Two Hague 
Peace Conferences, (Johns Hopkins Press), vol. I., Chapter XV; 
Holls, The Peace Conference at the Hague (Macmillan), pp. 
306-321; Moore, Digest of International Law (Government 
Printing Office), vol. VII, Sec. 1198; Barclay, Problems of 
International Practice and Diplomacy (Boston Book Co.), pp. 
63-70, 172-179; Choate, 'Immunity from Capture of Un- 
offending Property of the Enemy upon the High Seas', Amer- 
ican Addresses at the Second Hague Peace Conference (Ginn) 
pp. 1-25, (also published as a pamphlet of the World Peace 
Foundation, February-March, 1914) ; Hirst, 'The Capture and 
Destruction of Commerce at Sea', International Conciliation, 
November, 1910; Mahan, Armaments and Arbitration (Harper) 
and The Interest of America in Sea Power (Little, Brown). 

For a statement of the readiness of the British Government 
to consider proposals looking toward the immunity of private 
property from capture, see Sir Edward Grey's remarks in the 
House of Commons, April 1, 1913 and May 6, 1914. 

How far was the Declaration of London a partial expression 
of the policy? 

For authorities see Bentwick, The Declaration of London, and 
Scott, 'The Declaration of London of February 26, 1909,' 
American Journal of International Law, April and July, 19 14. 

To what extent is it fair to accuse England of having used her 
naval supremacy in a way corresponding to Germany's "mailed 
fist?" (e. g. in the Napoleonic Wars and at the time of the block- 
ade of the Confederate ports during the American Civil War.) 

See Egerton, British Foreign Policy in Europe (Macmillan) ; 
Piggott, The Neutral Merchant (University of London Press). 
For the restrictions by England on neutral trade in the present 

23 



war, see Clapp, Economic Aspects of the War (Yale) ; Phillipson, 
International Law and the Great War (Dutton); numerous 
editorials and articles in the American Journal of International 
Law; Corbett, The League of Peace and a Free Sea (Doran). 

Mr. Wilson's reference to "freedom of the seas" is to be welcomed 
on the ground of its lucidity and breadth of definition . . . No 
other formula that we have seen meets so fully the stipulations that 
an island Power like Great Britain is bound to make to insure its own 
safety and that of the Empire in time of war. It seems to be a natural 
corollary of a League of Nations that freedom of navigation must be 
denied any nation that violates international covenants for the main- 
tenance of peace. (British Labor Manifesto endorsing Mr. Wilson's 
address, January 9, 1918.) 

Would Mr. Wilson want Great Britain and the United States 
to relinquish their control of the sea without its being handed 
over to a League of Nations? 

On the handling of naval power by a League of Nations see 
Angell, The World's Highway (Doran); Sidebotham, 'The Free- 
dom of the Seas' in Towards a Lasting Settlement and Atlantic 
Monthly, August, 1916; Brailsford, A League of Nations 
(Macmillan). 

A blockade of the North Sea ought not to be regarded as legitimate. 
Those who desire the freedom of the seas must insist that there is some 
sea-power in existence which can effectively limit England's sole 
supremacy. Therefore, it is of the first importance for us that there 
should be no hindrance to the strengthening of our fleet. We used to 
say before the war that our fleet could protect our oversea trade and 
possessions. This task it has not fulfilled in the present war but we 
see the need to protect our coasts and provide a secure base for our 
submarines. The submarine weapon must not be struck out of our 
hand. It is the most effective help in war against a superior sea power, 
and the increased risks and uncertainties that it involves are well 
calculated to prevent the outbreak of war. The submarine is the war- 
ship of the small Power. So long as England maintains her supremacy 
it is indispensable to us. (Europaische Staats und Wirischaftszeitung, 
June 2, 1917, quoted in The New Europe, August 9, 1917.) 

Must measures be taken as part of the settlement to confine 
the use of the submarine to war vessels alone? 

Can there ever be freedom of the seas while the submarine 
is used against commerce? 

24 



Would it be proper for a League of Nations to use the sub- 
marine against merchant vessels? 

See Minor, 'The Rule of Law Which Should Govern the 
Conduct of Submarines with Reference to Enemy and Neutral 
Merchant Vessels and the Conduct of Such Vessels Toward 
Submarines', Proceedings of the American Society of Interna- 
tional Law, 191 6; Rogers, America's Case against Germany 
(Dutton) and authorities there cited; and Bellot, 'The Sub- 
marine Menace', Contemporary Review, August, 191 7. 

It would, however, be highly important for the freedom of shipping 
in the future if strongly fortified naval bases or important international 
trade routes, such as England has at Gibraltar, Malta, Aden, Hong- 
kong, the Falkland Islands and many other places, were removed. 
(Count Hertling, January 24, 191 8). 

Discuss this suggestion. 

The necessity for naval vessels will continue, but among the policies 
that will be approved in the peace conference that will follow the war 
there should be incorporated a provision guaranteeing an international 
navy to enforce international decrees. To this international navy, 
composed of separate naval establishments of all nations, each nation 
should contribute in proportion to its wealth and population, or upon 
some plan to insure that no nation can safely challenge the decree of 
the high international court ... It would be a lasting calamity 
if, when this war ends, there should linger as a burden upon a people 
already heavily taxed by wars a competitive programme of costly 
naval construction 

This country will, no doubt, take its proper place in bringing about 
such provisions in the peace treaties as will never again constrain any 
nation to adapt its naval programme to the programme of some other 
nation from which there is the compelling menace of possible and un- 
provoked attack. Such compulsion is the very negative of natural and 
orderly development. It means the tyranny of a programme dictated 
by apprehension rather than the free choice of a standard suggested 
by national needs and supported by national ideals. An international 
navy, on the contrary, will make possible such naval development as 
each nation deems fitting for its own people. It will also serve the 
"parliament of man" by providing a naval force ample enough to give 
validity to international decrees, and strong enough to keep inviolate 
the peace of the world. (From the report of the Secretary of the Navy 
to Congress, December, 191 7.) 



BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Angell, The World's Highway (Doran). 

Barclay, Problems of International Practice and Diplomacy (Boston 
Book Co.). 

Bourne, Toward an Enduring Peace (American Association for Inter- 
national Conciliation). 

Brailsford, A League of Nations (Macmillan). 

Clapp, Economic Aspects of the War (Yale). 

Corbett, The League of Peace and a Free Sea (Doran). 

'Cosmos', The Basis of Durable Peace (Scribner). 

Egerton, British Foreign Policy in Europe (Macmillan). 

Holls, The Peace Conference at the Hague (Macmillan). 

Mahan, Armaments and Arbitration (Harper). 

Mahan, The Interest of America in Sea Power (Little, Brown). 

Moore, Digest of International Law, Vol. VII (Government Printing 
Office). 

Phillipson, International Law and the Great War (Dutton). 

Piggott, The Neutral Merchant (University of London Press). 

Rogers, America's Case against Germany (Dutton). 

Scott, The Two Hague Conferences (Johns Hopkins Press). 

American Addresses at the Second Hague Peace Conference (Ginn). 

American Journal of International Law. 

Atlantic Monthly. 

Contemporary Review. 

International Conciliation. 

The New Europe. 

World Peace Foundation. 



III. The removal, so far as possible, of all economic barriers 
and the establishment of an equality of trade conditions among 
all the nations consenting to the peace and associating themselves 
for its maintenance. 

Cf. previous utterances of Mr. Wilson : 

Responsible statesmen must now everywhere see, if they never saw 
before, that no peace can rest securely upon political or economic 
restrictions meant to benefit some nations and cripple or embarrass 
others, upon vindictive action of any sort or any kind of revenge or 
deliberate injury. (Reply to the Pope, August 27, 1917.) 

It might be impossible also in such untoward circumstances [if the 
German people were compelled to continue to live under "ambitious 

26 



and intriguing masters"] to admit Germany to the free economic inter- 
course which must inevitably spring out of the other partnerships of a 
real peace. But there would be no aggression in that; and such a 
situation, inevitable because of distrust, would in the very nature of 
things sooner or later cure itself by processes which would assuredly 
set in. (Address to Congress, December 4, 1917.) 

How far are these expressions of opinion incompatible with 
the Resolutions of the Paris Economic Conference? 

For the texts of the Resolution see Hobson, The New Pro- 
tectionism (Putnam), Appendix; European Economic Alliances 
(National Foreign Trade Council) ; Congressional Record, July 
10, 1916, p. 12284; an d Current History, August, 1916, p. 928. 
See also Clark, 'Shall There Be War after the War? The 
Economic Conference at Paris,' American Journal of Inter- 
national Law, October, 191 7. 

Does Mr. Wilson propose conditional economic war and say, 
in effect, to the German people that they will have nothing 
to fear if they cease to rely on the prowess of their military 
masters? 

Did the entrance of the United States into the war cause 
the German people to attach more importance to the economic 
war after the war? 

Cf. the Reichstag Resolution: "No less does the Reichstag 
reject all schemes which aim at creating economic isolation 
and enmity among nations after the war," and the German 
Chancellor's statement, July 19, 1917: 

We must by an understanding and give and take guarantee the 
conditions of existence of the German Empire upon the Continent and 
overseas. Peace must build the foundation of a lasting reconciliation, 
prevent the nations from being plunged into further enmity through 
economic blockades, and provide a safeguard that the league in arms 
of our opponents does not develop into an economic offensive against us. 

See Brailsford, 'The Reichstag and Economic Peace', The 
Fortnightly Review, October, 191 7. 

Without the existence of that vigorous industry which, after the 
shutting in of Germany, we converted mainly into a war industry we 
should long ago have lost this war. This kind of war industry, however, 
must, after peace, become relatively small, while millions of our fellow- 
countrymen will stream back into Germany from the trenches without 

27 



finding sufficient work there and, in any case, wages corresponding to 
the enormously increased prices of the necessaries of life. Imagine, if 
Ave simultaneously had to bear the burden of taxation which must fall 
on every German, even the poor — for the greatest exaction from prop- 
erty would not be sufficient even remotely to meet it — and further, if, 
in spite of the fallen value of German money, we must still buy the 
most necessary raw materials and food supplies from abroad, not- 
withstanding all the political and other hindrances which the situation 
would produce for all ! Can anyone in his heart of hearts really believe 
that tinder these circumstances, without an increase of power, without an 
indemnity, without security, we could avoid Germany's ruin? (Admiral 
Tirpitz in December, 1917, Loudon Weekly Times, December 7, 1917.) 
The economic weapon must in the case of Germany work in part 
through a grinding process of attrition, in part through a quickening 
among Germans of the desire for peace and in part through an increase 
of their fear of the inevitable economic penalties of prolonging hostilities. 
It will gradually persuade them to pay a higher price for the opportunity 
of negotiating; and in the end this price can be raised to any reasonable 
figure — any figure, that is, which does not deprive them subsequently 
of the essentials of national security and growth. (The New Republic, 
November 17, 1917.) 

How far has this position been taken by English opinion 
w r hich advocated the Paris Resolutions as a measure of reprisal? 
(See recent speeches of Lloyd George and the British Labor 
Party's memorandum on War Aims. International Concilia- 
tion, No. 123.) 

What would have been the prospect of carrying out suc- 
cessfully the programme of the Paris Resolutions? 

Is it possible for the Allies to accept or consider "the German 
invitation, so bluntly held out to them by the Chancellor, to 
enter into negotiations on the basis of bargaining for territory 
in exchange for economic concessions"? 

Or are the Allied peace terms "absolute, which admit of no 
bargaining"? 

Is it possible for the Allies to "invite the Central Powers to 
make peace by a certain date and threaten them with post-war 
economic reprisals varying in duration or intensity according 
to the length of their subsequent resistance?" (Quotations 
from 'The Economic Weapon', The New Europe, October 
4, 1917, which answers the last question in the negative.) 

28 



Arguing for another economic conference to consider the post-war 
situation, The New Europe says, however, that "it should be made 
clear to the Central Powers that when they have accepted the 
Allied terms, including, of course, full reparation by the guilty par- 
ties for the ravages of war and acts done in violation of inter- 
national law, there is no desire to penalize them further or to hinder 
their recuperation. Their peoples should be offered, under these con- 
ditions, a proportionate share in the controlled supplies and ensured 
against any legal restriction upon their legitimate trading activities 
at the expiration of the period of trade control. No pledge or action 
by Governments, of course, can give back to the German trading 
community the confidence of individual dealers or purchasers in the 
countries they have antagonized." (October 4, 1917.) 

Should the protectionist movement after the war have purely 
an economic and not a political motive? 

What attitude should be taken by Governments toward the 
export of capital to "backward countries"? 

See Brailsford, The War of Steel and Gold (Bell) and A 
League of Nations, Chap. IX ('The Economics of Peace') ; 
Lippmann, The Stakes of Diplomacy (Holt); and Hobson, 
The New Protectionism (Putnam), Towards International 
Government (Allen and Unwin), and 'The Open Door' in 
Towards a Lasting Settlement (Macmillan). 

Is Mr. Wilson's proposal consistent with the programme of 
the League to Enforce Peace providing for the joint use of 
economic and military force? 

What are some of the difficulties of using a boycott as a 
substitute for war? 

What would be your own feeling if an international boycott 
were applied to the United States, in a case in which you 
believed the United States to be in the right? 

What measure could be taken to prevent a boycotted coun- 
try from taking up arms and precipitating the appeal to arms 
which the boycott is proposed to prevent? 

Do you share the view of the importance of selfish economic 
motives in politics that underlies such suggestions as the 
boycott as a means of preventing war? 

Are your own political actions motived exclusively, or 
chiefly, by considerations of private economic interest? 

29 



What are the possibilities of an international commission 
charged with the supervision of international economic ques- 
tions arising out of the war? 

BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Brailsford, The War of Steel and Gold (Bell). 

Brailsford, A League of Nations (Macmillan). 

IIobson, The New Protectionism (Putnam). 

Hobson, Towards International Government (Allen & Unwin). 

Towards a Lasting Settlement (Macmillan). 

European Economic Alliances (National Foreign Trade Council). 

American Journal of International Law. 

Congressional Record. 

Current History. 

International Conciliation. 

The Fortnightly Review. 

The New Europe. 



IV. Adequate guarantees given and taken that national arma- 
ments will be reduced to the lowest point consistent with domestic 
safety. 

Count Hertling in his speech of January 24, 1918, declared that 
"The idea of limitation of armaments is entirely discussable. The 
financial position of all European States after the war might most 
effectively promote a satisfactory solution." Count von Bernstorff in 
December, 1916, said that "it is Germany's desire, if the belligerents 
should enter upon a discussion of peace, to confer upon the question of 
the limitation of armaments. The Ambassador adds that in view of 
the German Government, a lasting peace can be accomplished only by 
reducing the armaments of Europe to a scale lower than that which 
obtained before the war. A rider is added to this statement that Ger- 
many views the international coalitions which existed before the war 
as objectionable, and as opposed to the maintenance of Peace." (London 
Daily News, December 16, 19 16.) 

Are the difficulties in the way of limiting armaments in- 
superable? 

What methods might be employed (e. g., reduction of the 
term of service in national armies, naval holidays, etc.)? 

Would the agreement, if arrived at, have to be under the 
direction of an international commission? 



How far is the practicability of limiting armaments bound 
up with the reorganization of Europe on a just and stable basis 
so that mutual trust will be more and more possible? 

Would you consider an attempt to limit armaments a begin- 
ning at the wrong end, an attempt to remove a symptom 
without effecting a cure? 

Before Germany can be persuaded to agree to a limitation 
of armaments and honestly abide by the treaty, is it necessary 
to make it clear that the German people have nothing to fear 
from the Entente Allies? 

Is a proposal for a limitation of armaments compatible with 
the Paris Resolutions? 

Would the armaments problem solve itself if the causes of 
friction, the grounds of fear were as far as possible removed 
by the Treaty of Settlement? 

See Barclay, Problems of International Practice and Diplo- 
macy (Boston Book Co.), pp. 123-130; Scott, The Two Hague 
Peace Conferences (Johns Hopkins Press), pp. 654-672; 
Trueblood, 'The Case for the Limitation of Armaments', 
American Journal of International Law, October, 1908; Mead, 
The Limitation of Armaments: The Position of the United 
States at the Hague Conferences (World Peace Foundation); 
Mahan, Armaments and Arbitration (Harpers), and for the 
Rush-Bagot Treaty under which the United States and Canada 
have not armed against each other, Foster, Limitation of Arma- 
ment on the Great Lakes (Report of the Secretary of State to 
the President of the United States, December, 1892, Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, Division of International 
Law, Pamphlet No. 2.) 

For Britain's record on disarmament and proposals of a 
naval holiday, see Murray, The Foreign Policy of Sir Edward 
Grey (Oxford), p. noff. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Barclay, Problems of International Practice and Diplomacy (Boston 

Book Co.). 
Mahan, Armaments and Arbitration (Harpers). 
Murray, The Foreign Policy of Sir Edward Grey (Oxford). 
Scott, The Two Hague Peace Conferences (Johns Hopkins Press). 

3i 



American Journal of International Law. 

Pamphlet No. 2, Division of International Law, Carnegie Endowment 

for International Peace. 
World Peace Foundation. 



V. Free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment 
of all colonial claims, based upon a strict observance of the prin- 
ciple that in determining all such questions of sovereignly the 
interests of the populations concerned must have equal weight 
with the equitable claims of the government whose title is to be 
determined. 

Practical realization of Mr. Wilson's principle in the realm of reality 
will encounter some difficulties in any case. I believe that for the 
present it may be left for England, which has the greatest colonial em- 
pire, to make what she will of this proposal of her ally. This point of the 
programme also will have to be discussed in due time, on the recon- 
struction of the world's colonial possessions, which we also demand 
absolutely. (Count Hertling, January- 24, 1918). 

The first official statement from England on the German 
colonies was not made until January 31, 1917. Previous 
speeches, the reply of the Allies to the December (1916) peace 
proposals, and Mr. Balfour's covering letter did not mention 
the issue. But "speaking with knowledge of full responsibility," 
Mr. Long, the Colonial Secretary, declared that "the German 
Colonies will never return to German rule. It is impossible. 
Our overseas empire will never tolerate any suggestion of the 
kind." Before this the silence on the colonial question had 
aroused alarm in the Dominions, and Mr. Long's pronounce- 
ment was in consonance with the changed policy on imperial 
matters that had been inaugurated with the new national 
ministry, marking as it did a new constitutional doctrine 
(January 31, 191 7). 

As to the German colonies, that is a matter which must be settled 
by the Great International Peace Congress. Let me point out that 
our critics talk as if we had annexed lands peopled by Germans, as if 
we had subjected the Teutonic people to British rule. When you come 
to settle who shall be the future trustees of these uncivilized lands, you 
must take into account the sentiments of the people themselves. What 



confidence has been inspired in their untutored minds by the German 
rule of which the}' have had an experience. Whether they are anxious 
to secure the return of their foimer masters, or whether they would 
rather trust their destinies to other and juster and — may I confidently 
say? — gentler hands than those which have had the government of 
them up to the present time? The wishes, the desires, and the interests 
of the people of those countries must be the dominant factor in settling 
their future government. That is the principle upon which we are 
proceeding. (Mr. Lloyd George, December 20, 1917.) 

General Smuts in one of his speeches described the dangers 
that threatened the future not only of Africa, but also of 
Europe. The war has shown that enormously valuable mil- 
itary material exists in the Black Continent. Germany plotted 
a grandiose but terrible scheme for a great Central African 
Empire embracing not only the Cameroons and the East 
African Colonies but also the Portuguese possessions and the 
Congo. The man power would be available to train a powerful 
black army. 

"It will be a serious question," said General Smuts, "whether they 
are going to allow a state of affairs like that to be possible, and to be- 
come a menace not only to Africa, but perhaps to Europe itself. I hope 
that one of the results of this war will be some arrangement or con- 
vention among the nations interested in Central Africa by which the 
military training of the natives in that area will be prevented as we 
have prevented it in South Africa." 

In this speech General Smuts did not definitely declare what position 
the Empire should assume with reference to the colonies at the settle- 
ment. But he did point out that there is now an open route from 
Egypt to the Cape, and declared it should be borne in mind at the 
conference that "having no danger on the Atlantic seaboard or on the 
Indian seaboard to our very essential communications as an Empire" 
was a security that could not readily be given up. (Smuts, War-Time 
Speeches, [Doran] pp. 81-83.) 

How far should the United States have a voice in deter- 
mining the future of the German colonies? 

If the use of them as "pawns" violated Mr. Wilson's principle 
should the latter prevail? 

Dr. Seton-Watson has pointed out that there are great dangers in a 
policy that would insist upon the retention of the German colonies, 
for it would justify Germany's naval expansion. Germany's sea trade, 

33 



the argument runs, existed only by the sufferance of the British navy. 
"If, as a result of the war, we take from her all that we can, we shall 
ingrain this point of view in every German. We shall thus tend to 
perpetuate the old situation, with its intolerable competitive arma- 
ments." (R. W. Seton-Watson, 'The Issues of the War', The War and 
Democracy, p. 243.) As to New Guinea, Samoa, and German South- 
west Africa, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa will have to be 
consulted. "It is only in the case of German colonies which border 
upon British Crown colonies (e. g., Togoland, Cameroon, or East 
Africa) that the decision will rest entirely with the European govern- 
ments. At this stage [1915] it would be absurd to suggest even the bare 
outlines of a settlement; but it is well to emphasize the fact that it 
involves not only the United Kingdom but the Dominions, and that 
on its solution depends the future development of the British Empire. 
In other words, the war can only result in the downfall of the Empire 
or in the achievement of Imperial Federation and a further democrati- 
zation of the Central Government" (pp. 243-244). 

See 'The Future of the German Colonies', Johnston, 'The 
Case for Retention', and Dawson, 'The Case for Conditional 
Return', Contemporary Review, September, 1917; Bond, 'The 
Conquest of the Cameroon', Contemporary Review, May, 1916. 

The British Labor Party in its Memorandum on War Aims, adopted 
December 28, 1917, urged that "all the present colonies of the European 
Powers in tropical Africa should be transferred to the Super-National 
Authority and administered as a single independent African State with 
its own trained staff." In its message to the Russian people issued on 
January 15th, the Labor Party said "that the peace conference would 
be well-advised to place all tropical Africa under uniform international 
control." 

Would it be wise to scrap existing administrations that work 
well, as in Nigeria and Uganda, for example, and to attempt 
untried international administration? (H. G. Wells, 'The 
African Riddle', The New Republic, February 23, 1918; 'The 
Resettlement of Africa', New York Evening Post, February 
13, 1918.) 

Would it be possible to reenact the Berlin Convention (1884- 
1885; for the 'General Act' see the American Journal of Inter- 
national Law [Supplement], pp. 7-25) to declare freedom of 
trade, free access for all traders to ports and rivers, neutrality 
in the event of a European War, limitation of armaments and 

34 



military training to the necessities of police, and to have 
national administration supervised by an international com- 
mission as is suggested for the Dardanelles? 

What would have been the possibilities of such an arrange- 
ment (i. e., a treaty with an organization to enforce it) when 
the Berlin Convention was violated by King Leopold? 

Can the value of Germany's colonies as "pawns" be ignored? 

Would it be dangerous to leave Germany without any 
colonial outlet? 

Can the "self-determination" principle be applied in the 
African colonies? Would the world have confidence in the 
decision of the chiefs? (See 'The Settlement of Africa', 
London Nation, January 19, 191 8.) 

BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Gibbons, The New Map of Africa (Century). 
Seton-Watson, The War and Democracy. 
Smuts, War-Time Speeches (Doran). 

American Journal of International Law. 

Contemporary Review. 

London Nation. 

The New York Evening Post. 

The New Republic. 



VI. The evacuation of all Russian territory and such a settle- 
ment of all questions affecting Russia as will secure the best and 
freest cooperation of the other nations of the world in obtaining 
for her an unhampered and unembarrassed opportunity for the 
independent determination of her own political development and 
national policy and assure her of a sincere welcome into the society 
of free nations tinder institutions of her own choosing; and, more 
than a welcome, assistance also of every kind that she may need 
and may herself desire. The treatment accorded Russia by her 
sister nations in the mo?iths to come will be the acid test of their 
good-will, of their comprehension of her needs as distinguished from 
their own interests, and of their intelligent and unselfish sympathy. 

(The situation in Russia is so chaotic that only a few ref- 
erences and questions will be ventured.) 

35 



How far is the United States morally bound to accept this 
as one of its war aims? 

Is the policy of the Entente Allies partly to blame for the 
Russian debacle, i. e., in not making a more definite and non- 
imperialistic statement of war aims? (See Brailsford, 'By 
Grace of Allied Policy', The New Republic, January 19, 1918.) 

For an excellent outline of Russian history and contempo- 
rary conditions, see The Round Table, December, 1914. Other 
books of interest are Russian Realities and Problems (Cam- 
bridge University Press) ; Mavor, Economic History of Russia 
(Dutton, 2 vols.); Williams, Russia of the Russians (Scribner) ; 
Vinogradoff , Self-Government in Russia (Holt) ; Trotsky, The 
Bolsheviki and Peace (Boni & Liveright) ; Sands, 'The Uk- 
ranians (Ruthenians) and the War', Contemporary Review, 
March, 1916; Vinogradoff, Russia, the Psychology of a Nation 
(Oxford Pamphlets). 

BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Mavor, Economic History of Russia (Dutton). 

Trotsky, The Bolsheviki and Peace (Boni & Liveright). 

Vinogradoff, Russia, the Psychology of a Nation (Oxford Pamphlets). 

Vinogradoff, Self-Government in Russia (Holt). 

Russian Realities and Problems (Cambridge University Press). 

Williams, Russia of the Russians (Scribner). 

Contemporary Review. 
The New Republic. 
The Round Table. 



VII. Belgium, the whole world will agree, must be evacuated 
and restored, without any attempt to limit the sovereignty which 
she enjoys in common with all other free nations. No other 
single act will serve as this will serve to restore confidence among 
the nations in the laws which they have themselves set and deter- 
mined for the government of their relations with one another. 
Without this healing act the ivhole structure and validity of inter- 
national law is forever impaired. 

The first requirement, therefore, always put forward by the British 
Government and their allies, has been the complete restoration, polit- 
ical, territorial, and economic, of the independence of Belgium and such 

36 



reparation as can be made for the devastation of its towns and provinces. 
. It is no more and no less than an insistence that before there 
can be any hope for stable peace, this great breach of the public law of 
Europe must be repudiated and so far as possible repaired. 

Reparation means recognition. Unless international right is recog- 
nized by insistence on payment for injury, done in defiance of its 
canons, it can never be a reality. (Mr. Lloyd George, January 5, 1918.) 

My predecessor in office repeatedly declared that at no time did the 
annexation of Belgium to Germany form a point in the programme of 
German policy. The Belgian question belongs to those questions the 
details of which are to be settled by negotiation at the peace conference. 

So long as our opponents have not unreservedly taken the standpoint 
that the integrity of the Allies' territory can offer the only possible 
basis of peace discussion, I must adhere to the standpoint hitherto 
always adopted and refuse the removal in advance of the Belgium 
affair from the entire discussion. (Count Herding, January 24, 
1918.) But for the views of von Bethmann-Hollweg, see Gerard, 
My Four Years in Germany (Doran) ; and for the attitude of the Six 
Industrial Associations of Germany, which desire Belgium to "be sub- 
jected to the German Imperial Legislation, both in military and tariff 
matters, as well as in regard to currency, banking, and post," see 
Headlam, The Issue (Houghton, Mifflin). 

For the history, government, and present economic develop- 
ment of Belgium, see Ensor, Belgium (Holt: Home University 
Library); Ogg, The Governments of Europe (Macmillan), 
Chap. XXIX, and articles in the Encyclopedia Britannica. 

When Mr. Wilson says that there must be no attempt to 
limit Belgium's sovereignty, does he .mean that it is out of the 
question to agree to neutralization again? or simply that Ger- 
many must retain no control over her? 

Is the restoration of Belgium a war aim more (a) because 
it is due the Belgians for their heroic resistance? (b) because 
Germany cannot be permitted, as a measure of safety on the 
part of the Entente Powers, to retain control over her? (c) 
or because only by restoration can public right be enthroned 
as the guiding principle among states? 

See Davis, What Europe Owes to Belgium (Oxford Pamph- 
lets) and Fisher, The Value of Small States (Oxford Pamphlets). 

Should Belgium and Luxemburg be joined? (See Destree, 
'Belgium and Luxemburg', The New Europe, July 12, 1917.) 



Have respect for treaties and the habit of observing them 
and international law increased or decreased since 1839? (See 
Wright, 'The Legal Nature of Treaties', American Journal 
of International Law, July, 1916.) 

Does Germany's conduct toward Belgium raise a doubt 
as to whether the present rulers of Germany can ever be trusted 
to keep a treaty unless convenient to them? 

To have accepted mediation in 1914 would have been for a German 
Chancellor a notable act of grace: to refuse it if a League of Peace is 
constituted would be a startling act of perfidy. It requires no excessive 
exercise of faith to assume that public opinion, if all the Great Powers 
were pledged to adopt this pacific procedure before resorting to arms, 
would be in each country sufficiently enlightened to insist upon it, 
and to condemn as the aggressors the statesmen who broke the com- 
pact. (Brailsford, A League of Nations, p. 57.) 

Would the adhesion of America to a League of Nations con- 
tribute to the establishment of conditions that would prevent 
a power from breaking treaties at its convenience? 

What would have been Germany's probable attitude in 
August, 1914, if the United States had been bound to support 
Belgium? 

There are a number of excellent discussions of the legal 
status of Belgium at the outbreak of the war: Stowell, The 
Diplomacy of the War of 1914 (Houghton, Mifflin) ; de Visscher, 
Belgium's Case: A Juridical Inquiry (Doran) ; Baty and Mor- 
gan, War, Its Conduct and Legal Results (Button) ; Waxweiler, 
Belgium, Neutral and Loyal (Putnam) ; Phillipson, Interna- 
tional Law and the Great War (Dutton) ; Renault, The First 
Violations of International Law (Longmans); Labberton, 
Belgium and Germany (Open Court); Fuehr, The Neutrality 
of Belgium (Funk & Wagnalls) ; Neilson, How Diplomats Make 
War (Huebsch) ; Garner, 'Some Questions of International 
Law in the European War: The Violation of Neutral Terri- 
tory', American Journal of International Law, January, 1915; 
International Conciliation, January, 1915. 

For the obligation on the United States to protest, see, 
among many authorities, Harvey, 'The Government and the 
War', North American Review, May, 1915; Rogers, 'Presi- 

38 



dent Wilson's Neutrality: An American View', Contemporary 
Review, May, 1915; Roosevelt, America and the World. War 
(Scribner); 'Mr. Roosevelt's After Thought', The New Repub- 
lic, March 25, 1916; 'The Hague Conventions and the Neu- 
trality of Belgium and Luxemburg', American Journal of 
International Law, October, 191 5; and a most thoughtful 
paper by Professor de Visscher, 'De la Belligerance dans ses 
Rapports avec la Violation de la Neutrality', in Problems of 
the War, Vol. II, p. 93 (Grotius Society Papers, 1916). 

For Germany's violations of law in Belgium, see, among 
many authorities, Toynbee, The German Terror in Belgium 
(Doran) and Garner, 'Some Questions of International Law 
in the European War', American Journal of I filer national Law, 
January, 1915, January and July, 1917. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Baty and Morgan, War, its Conduct and Legal Results (Dulton). 

Brailsford, A League of Nations (Macmillan). 

Davis, What Europe Owes to Belgium (Oxford Pamphlets). 

de Visscher, Belgium's Case: A Juridical Inquiry (Doran). 

Ensor, Belgium (Holt). 

Fisher, The Value of Small States (Oxford Pamphlets). 

Fuehr, The Neutrality of Belgium (Funk and Wagnalls). 

Gerard, My Four Years in Germany (Doran). 

Headlam, The Issue (Houghton, Mifflin). 

Labberton, Belgium and Germany (Open Court). 

Neilson, How Diplomats Make War (Huebsch). 

Ogg, The Governments of Europe (Macmillan). 

Phillipson, International Law and the Great War (Dutton). 

Renault, The First Violation of International Law (Longmans). 

Stowell, The Diplomacy of the War of 1914 (Houghton, Mifflin). 

Toynbee, Tlie German Terror in Belgium (Doran). 

Waxweiler, Belgium, Neutral and Loyal (Putnam). 

American Journal of International Law. 

Contemporary Review. 

Grotius Society Papers, 1916 (London: Sweet & Maxwell). 

International Conciliation. 

North American Review. 

The New Europe. 

The New Republic. 

39 



VIII. All French territory should be freed and the invaded 
portions restored, and the wrong done to France by Prussia in 
i8y i in the matter of Alsace-Lorraine which has unsettled the 
peace of the world for nearly fifty years, should be righted in order 
that peace may once more be made secure in the interest of all. 

We mean to stand by the French democracy to the death in the 
demand they make for a reconsideration of the great wrong of 1871, 
when, without any regard to the wishes of the population, two French 
provinces were torn from the side of France and incorporated in the 
German Empire. This sore has poisoned the peace of Europe for half 
a century, and, until it is cured, healthy conditions will not have been 
restored. There can be no better illustration of the folly and wicked- 
ness of using a transient military success to violate national right. 
(Mr. Lloyd George, January 4, 1918.) 

Do these declarations mean that Alsace-Lorraine must be 
restored to France or simply that the problem will be settled 
so that the peace of the world will no longer be disturbed? 

How far is the United States obligated to support France 
in her demands for the unconditional return of Alsace-Lor- 
raine? 

On the general problem, see Putnam, Alsace and Lorraine, 
from Caesar to Kaiser, 58 B. C. to 187 1 A . D. (Putnam) ; Kazen, 
Alsace-Lorraine under German Rule (Holt); Grant, 'France 
and Alsace-Lorraine', The Political Quarterly, May, 1915; 
Toynbee, Nationality and the War (Dutton), pp. 40-48 (which 
argues for a plebiscite); 'Cosmos', The Basis of Durable 
Peace (Scribner), Chap. VII; Cawcroft, 'The Problem of 
Alsace-Lorraine; Is There a Democratic Solution'? The World 
Court, January, 1918; Blumenthal, Alsace-Lorraine (Putnam); 
von Biilow, Imperial Germany (Dodd); Gibbons, The New 
Map of Europe (Century); Stoddard, Present Day Europe, 
Its National States of Mind (Century); von Mach, Germany's 
Point of View (McClurg); Lauzanne, 'Why France Wants 
Alsace-Lorraine', World's Work, February, 1918; Whyte, 'The 
Lost Provinces: Alsace-Lorraine', The New Europe, Novem- 
ber 16, 1916; Holdich, 'New Political Boundaries in Europe: 
Alsace-Lorraine', The New Europe, February 8, 1917; Eccles, 
Alsace-Lorraine (Oxford Pamphlets). 

40 



For special stress on the natural resources of Alsace-Lorraine 
see Gregory, 'Geology and Strategy', Contemporary Review, De- 
cember, 1915; Gardner, 'Lorraine, the Test of Victory', World's 
Work, January, 1918; and Brooks, 'The Real Problem of 
Alsace-Lorraine', North American Review, November, 191 7. 

From 1871 till 191 1, Alsace-Lorraine was governed as a direct 
appanage of the Imperial Crown; in the latter year it received a con- 
stitution, but nothing even remotely resembling self-government. 
Contrary to the expectation of most Germans, the two provinces have 
not become German in sentiment; indeed the unconciliatory methods 
of Prussia have steadily increased their estrangement, despite their 
share in the commercial prosperity of the Empire. Those who know 
intimately the undercurrent of feeling in Alsace-Lorraine are unanimous 
in asserting that if before last July an impartial plebiscite, without 
fear of the consequences, could have been taken among the inhabitants, 
an overwhelming majority would have voted for reunion with France. 
But having once been the battleground of the two nations and living 
in permanent dread of a repetition of the tragedy, the leaders of 
political thought in Alsace-Lorraine favored a less drastic solution. 
They knew that Germany would not relinquish her hold nor France 
renounce her aspirations without another armed struggle; but they 
believed that the grant of real autonomy within the Empire, such as 
would place them on an equal footing with Wiirtemberg or Baden, 
would render their position tolerable, and by removing the chief source 
of friction between France and Germany, create the ground work for 
more cordial and lasting relations between Germany and the two 
Western Powers. (Dr. R. W. Seton-Watson in The War and, Democ- 
racy, pp. 244-246.) 

For the status of Alsace-Lorraine in the German Empire 
see Lowell, Governments and Parties in Continental Europe 
(Harvard University Press), or Ogg, The Governments of 
Europe (Macmillan). 

"What we have gained by arms in six months we shall have to defend 
by arms for fifty years," said General von Moltke after the Franco- 
Prussian War. Prince von Billow's opinion {Imperial Germany, p. 69) 
was as follows: "The irreconcilability of France is a factor that we 
must reckon with in our political calculations. It seems to be weakness 
to entertain the hope of a real and sincere reconciliation with France, 
so long as we have no intention of giving up Alsace-Lorraine. And 
there is no such intention in Germany." 

4i 



How far would these considerations apply in the case of a 
forcible re-annexation by France? 

Would the unconditional return of Alsace-Lorraine to France 
be inconsistent with Mr. Wilson's principle regarding the self- 
determination of free peoples? 

Would this principle require that Alsace-Lorraine be 
allowed, "under the protection of the super-national authority 
or League of Nations freely to decide what shall be their future 
political position"? ('Memorandum on War Aims of the 
British Labor Party'. International Conciliation, No. 123.) 

What would be the difficulties of a referendum in Alsace- 
Lorraine? 

Assuming that it could not be conducted under French or 
German auspices, would an international commission be able 
to secure a free decision? 

Would people sent in by Germany be permitted to vote and 
would the plebiscite be delayed until the return of the exiles 
to France and elsewhere? 

Would either France or Germany peaceably accept an 
adverse decision? 

See Toynbee, Nationality and the War, p. 40. 

Alsace-Lorraine falls into three well-marked areas: 

(1) Western Lorraine (the Metz region) is Catholic and French by 
choice, and language, but it contains only fifteen per cent, of the total 
population of the Reichsland. (2) Northeastern Lorraine, on the other 
hand, is mainly German and Protestant, and, together with the north- 
west district of Alsace, would certainly prefer to be German. (3) About 
the real opinion of the greater part of Alsace, German by race, Catholic 
by religion, but with a persistent French tradition, no one can dog- 
matize. (Brailsford, A League of Nations, pp. 1 15-125.) 

Would the proposed plebiscite have to give these districts 
an opportunity to decide for themselves? 

Should the fact that economic resources do not follow the 
lines of popular feeling be taken into consideration? 

Would it be possible to neutralize Alsace-Lorraine under a 
guarantee of the powers or under an international commission? 
Or simply to give it independence? Or to form it into a federa- 
tion with Belgium that would make a stretch of neutralized 
territory from the North Sea to Italy? 

42 



Cf. the status of Savoy, a neutralized province of France, 
and the cession of the Ionian Islands to Greece in 1864. See 
Cambridge Modern History, Vol. XI, p. 642; Lawrence, Prin- 
ciples of International Law (Heath), Sees. 246-248, and Fayle, 
The Great Settlement (Duffield), pp. 148-153. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Blumenthal, Alsace-Lorraine (Putnam). 

Brailsford, A League of Nations (Macmillan). 

'Cosmos', The Basis of Durable Peace (Scribners). 

Eccles, Alsace-Lorraine (Oxford Pamphlets). 

Fayle, The Great Settlement (Duffield). 

Gibbons, The New Map of Europe (Century). 

Hazen, Alsace-Lorraine under German Ride (Holt). 

Lawrence, Principles of International Law (Heath). 

Lowell, Governments and Parties in Continental Europe. 

Ogg, Governments of Europe (Macmillan). 

Putnam, Alsace and Lorraine, from Caesar to Kaiser (Putnam). 

Seton-Watson, The War and Democracy. 

Stoddard, Present-Day Europe, Its National States of Mind (Century). 

Toynbee, Nationality and the War (Dutton). 

von Bulow, Imperial Germany (Dodd). 

von Mach, Germany's Point of View (McClurg). 

Cambridge Modem History. 

Contemporary Review. 
North American Review. 
Political Quarterly. 
The New Europe. 
The World Court. 
World's Work. 



IX. A readjustment of the frontiers of Italy should be effected 
along clearly recognizable lines of nationality. 

What influence has the quarrel with the Papacy had upon 
Italy's political development? 

What are the problems that the South of Italy presents? 

Why did Italy join the Triple Alliance? 

Why did she leave it? 

43 



Consider the justification (suggesting any modifications that 
seem good) of the Italian claim to control both shores of the 
Adriatic, from the point of view (a) of nationality, (b) of strate- 
gic security, and (c) of the future peace of the world. 

On Italian history, see King and Okey, Italy of Today 
(Nisbet) ; Seton-Watson, The Balkans, Italy and the Adriatic 
(Nisbet); Coolidge, The Origins of the Triple Alliance (Scrib- 
ner) ; Wallace, Greater Italy (Scribner) . 

The terms of the Triple Alliance have not been published 
but Articles I, III, IV, and VII are given in the second Austro- 
Ilungarian Red Book as follows : 

Article I. The High Contracting Parties mutually promise peace and 
friendship, and shall not enter into any alliance or engagement directed 
against any one of their respective States. 

They bind themselves to proceed to negotiations on such political and 
economic questions of a general nature as may arise; and, moreover, 
promise their mutual support within the scope of their own interests. 

Article III. If one or two of the High Contracting Parties should be 
attacked without direct provocation on their part, and be engaged in war 
with two or several great Powers not signatory to this Treaty, the casus 
foederis shall apply simultaneously to all the High Contracting Parties. 

Article IV. In the event that a Great Power not signatory to this 
Treaty should menace the safety of the States of one of the High Con- 
tracting Parties, and that the menaced Party should be forced to make 
war on that Power, the two others bind themselves to observe toward 
their ally a benevolent neutrality. Each one of them in that case 
reserves to herself the right to participate in the war, if she should 
consider it appropriate to make common cause with her Ally. 

Article VII. Austria-Hungary and Italy, being desirous solely that 
the territorial status quo in the near East be maintained as much as 
possible, pledge themselves to exert their influence to prevent all terri- 
torial modification which may prove detrimental to one or the other 
of the Powers signatory to this Treaty. To that end they shall com- 
municate to one another all such information as may be suitable for 
their mutual enlightenment, concerning their own dispositions as well 
as those of other Powers. 

Should, however, the status quo in the regions of the Balkans, or 
of the Turkish Coasts and islands in the Adriatic and Aegean Seas, in 
the course of events become impossible; and should Austria-Hungary 
or Italy be placed under the necessity, either by the action of a third 
Power or otherwise, to modify that status quo by a temporary or per- 

44 



manent occupation on their part, such occupation shall take place only 
after a previous agreement has been made between the two Powers, 
based on the principle of reciprocal compensation for all advantages, 
territorial or otherwise, which either of them may obtain beyond the 
present status quo, a compensation which shall satisfy the legitimate 
interests and aspirations of both Parties. {Austro-Hungarian Red 
Book [No. 2], Appendix, Nos. 1, 14, 15, 16; Scott [ed.], Diplomatic 
Documents Relative to the European War, pp. 335, 346 [Oxford].) 

For Italy's refusal to stay in the Triple Alliance and her 
declaration of war on Austria-Hungary, see the Austro-Hun- 
garian Red Books, and Italy's Green Book {International Con- 
ciliation, No. 93, August, 191 5) which will be found in Scott's 
edition of the diplomatic correspondence. See also Feiling, 
Italian Policy since 1870 (Oxford Pamphlets); Hope, Why 
Italy is with the Allies (Clay); 'Civis Italicus', Italy and the 
Jugo-Slav Peoples (Council for the Study of International 
Relations); Rigano, The War and the Settlement: An Italian 
View (Council for the Study of International Relations). 

A secret treaty between Italy, Russia, Great Britain, 
and France signed on May 9, 191 5, two weeks before Italy's 
entrance into the war, promises Italy territorial compensation 
for her military assistance. The Treaty was among the 
secret engagements made public by the Bolsheviki and a 
translation was published by The New Europe (See Current 
History, March, 1918, p. 494; the treaties also appeared in 
the New York Evening Post, January 25, 26 and 28, 1918). 

Would the changes contemplated by this treaty be more 
than "a readjustment of the frontiers of Italy . . . along 
clearly recognizable lines of nationality"? 

See Toynbee, Nationality and the War (Dutton), Chap. V; 
Gibbons, The New Map of Europe (Century), Chap. VII, 
XIII; Gibbons, The Reconstruction of Poland and the Near 
East, Chap. IV; Taylor, The Future of the Southern Slavs, 
Chap. IV, esp. pp. 150-160; Dominian, 'The Nationality Map 
of Europe', A League of Nations, December, 191 7 (World 
Peace Foundation) ; Murri, 'Italy and England', Contemporary 
Review, November, 1915; 'O. de L.', 'Albania, Austria, Italy, 
Essad', Contemporary Review, August, 1917; and the provi- 
sions of the secret treaty. 

45 



BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Coolidge, The Origins of the Triple Alliance (Scribner). 

Feiling, Italian Policy since 1870 (Oxford Pamphlets). 

Gibbons, The New Map of Europe (Century). 

Gibbons, The Reconstruction of Poland and the Near East (Century). 

Hope, Why Italy is with the Allies (Clay). 

King and Okey, Italy of Today (Nisbet). 

Scott, Diplomatic Documents Relative to the European War (Oxford). 

Seton-Watson, The Balkans, Italy and the Adriatic (Nisbet). 

Taylor, The Future of the Southern Slavs (Dodd, Mead). 

Toynbee, Nationality and the War (Dutton). 

Wallace, Greater Italy (Scribner) . 

Contemporary Review. 

Council for the Study of International Relations. 

Current History. 

International Cone Hint ion. 

The New Europe. 

World Peace Foundation. 



X. The peoples of Austria-Hungary , whose place among the 
nations we wish to see safeguarded and assured, should be accorded 
the freest opportunity of autonomous development. 

What constitutes a nation? Are "race" and "nationality" 
different? (See The War and Democracy, Chap. II.) 

What constitutes a state? 

Is the British Empire a state or many states, or both? 
Which is the German Empire? The Austro-Hungarian Empire? 

What holds a state together? How is it that the Austro- 
Hungarian state can induce Southern Slavs and Italians to 
fight against the Allies who include in their alliance Serbia 
and Montenegro and Italy? 

What is the relative importance of the following factors of 
political cohesion: common nationality, loyalty to a dynasty 
(e. g., in Prussia), economic convenience (e. g., Austria-Hun- 
gary), geographical unity (e.g., Switzerland)? 

Should each nationality form a separate sovereign state? 
or are the claims of nationality adequately met by "home rule" 
in some sort of federal framework? See The War and Democ- 

46 



racy; Toynbee, Nationality and the War; Fayle, The Great 
Settlement; Brailsford, A League of Nations, Chap. IV; and 
Dominian, The Frontiers of Language and Nationality in 
Europe (Holt). 

Consider the problems raised by the fact that members of 
different races are at present united under the Austrian Em- 
pire. Consider the relative advantages and disadvantages of 
dismemberment as compared with federation (a) from the 
point of view of nationality, (b) in relation to the formation 
of a League of Nations after the war. 

See Steed, The Hapsburg Monarchy (Constable) ; Seton- 
VVatson, Racial Problems in Hungary, Corruption and Reform 
in Hungary, The Southern Slav Question (Constable) ; Gibbons, 
The New Map of Europe (Century); Beaven, Austrian Policy 
Since i86j (Oxford Pamphlets). 

What is your explanation of the survival of the Austrian 
Empire? 

How far is the continued control by Germany of Austria- 
Hungary and the oppression of subject races essential to "Mit- 
tel-Europa"? 

See Naumann, Central Europe (Knopf) ; Cheradame, Pan- 
Germany: The Disease and the Cure (Atlantic Monthly Press) ; 
Brailsford, 'The Shaping of Mid-Europe', Contemporary Re- 
view, March, 1916; Pergler, 'Should Austria-Hungary Exist?', 
Yale Review, January, 1918. 

Do you think that Mr. Wilson's professions of friendship for 
Austria-Hungary (see his messages of December 4, 191 7, and Feb- 
ruary 11,1918) will wean Austria-Hungary from Germany and 
make her willing to consent to recognize subject nationalities? 

What would be the probable result if Austria-Hungary 
acted in accordance with the following principles (Mr. Wil- 
son's address of February 11, 1918) : 

First, that each part of the final settlement must be based upon the 
essential justice of that particular case and upon such adjustments as 
are most likely to bring a peace that will be permanent; 

Second, that peoples and provinces are not to be bartered about 
from sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were mere chattels and 
pawns in a game, even the great game, now forever discredited, of the 
balance of power; but that 

47 



Third, every territorial settlement involved in this war must be 
made in the interest and for the benefit of the populations concerned, 
and not as part of any mere adjustment or compromise of claims 
amongst rival states, and 

Fourth, that all well defined national aspirations shall be accorded 
the utmost satisfaction that can be accorded them without introducing 
new or perpetuating old elements of discord and antagonism that 
would be likely in time to break the peace of Europe, and consequently 
of the world. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Beaven, Austrian Policy since 1867 (Oxford Pamphlets). 

Brailsford, A League of Nations (Macmillan). 

Cheradame, Pan-Germany: The Disease and the Cure (Atlantic 

Monthly Press). 
Domini an, The Frontiers of Language and Nationality in Europe (Holt). 
Fayle, The Great Settlement (Dumeld). 
Gibbons, The New Map of Europe (Century). 
Naumann, Central Europe (Knopf). 

Seton-Watson, Racial Problems in Hungary, (Constable). 
Seton-Watson, Corruption and Reform in Hungary, (Constable). 
Seton-Watson, The Southern Slav Question (Constable). 
Steed, The Hapsburg Monarchy (Constable). 
Toynbee, Nationality and the War (Dutton). 
The War and Democracy (Macmillan). 

Contemporary Review. 
Yale Review. 



XI. Rumania, Serbia, and Montenegro should be evacuated; 
occupied territories restored; Serbia accorded free and secure 
access to the sea; and the relations of the several Balkan states 
to one another determined by friendly counsel along historically 
established lines of allegiance and nationality; and international 
guarantees of the political and economic independence and terri- 
torial integrity of the several Balkan states should be entered into. 

On Balkan problems generally see Buxton (Noel), The War 
and the Balkans (Allen); Seton-Watson, The Southern Slav 
Question and the Hapsburg Monarchy (Constable) ; Hogarth, 
The Near East (Oxford); Forbes, Mitrany, and Toynbee, 
The Balkans (Oxford); 'Diplomatist', Nationality and War 

48 



■in the Near East (Oxford) ; Toynbee, Nationality and the War 
(Dutton) ; Gibbons, The New Map of Europe (Century) ; and 
Marriott, The Eastern Question (Oxford). 

With particular reference to Rumania, see Washburn, 
'The Tragedy of Rumania', Atlantic Monthly, December, 1917; 
Leeper, The Justice of Rumania's Cause (Doran); Mitrany, 
Rumania: Her History and Politics (Oxford Pamphlets) ; the 
secret memorandum made public by the Bolsheviki (New York 
Evening Post, January 25, 1918), and many important articles 
in The New Europe, some of them by the Rumanian statesman, 
Take Jonescu. 

On Serbia, see Chirol, Serbia and the Serbs (Oxford Pam- 
phlets) ; Velimirovic, Serbia's Place in Human History (Coun- 
cil for the Study of International Relations) ; Temperley, 
A History of Serbia (Bell) ; Taylor, The Future of the Southern 
Slavs (Dodd, Mead). 

Serbia is the route to the East ... It cannot be repeated too 
often that Serbia is the chief obstacle to those plans of political pre- 
domination from Berlin to Bagdad, which lie at the back of Germany's 
mind in the world-war; that her services to the common cause entitle 
her to be treated on a common footing with all the other allies; and 
that just as Serbia is the route from the West to Constantinople and 
Salonica so she is the route, as in Turkish days, from Eastern Europe 
to Vienna and Berlin. Sooner or later it will become clear, even to the 
man in the street, that the way to Berlin lies not through Belgium but 
through the Balkans and the great Hungarian plains. (Seton-Watson, 
The Balkans, Italy and the Adriatic, pp. 31-32.) 

Questions suggested with particular reference to Italy and 
Austria-Hungary are appropriate in considering the Balkans. 
The circumstances surrounding the entry of Rumania, etc., 
into the war can be traced in Current History or in some more 
careful record like Nelson's History of the War, written by 
Colonel John Buchan (Nelson). The following general ques- 
tions, however, may be profitably discussed: 

1. The causes of the Crimean, Russo-Turkish, and first and 

and second Balkan Wars. 

2. Thedefectsof the Balkan settlements of 1856, 1 878, and 1913. 

3. The problems of Macedonia and Albania. 

4. The possibilities of a Southern Slav United Kingdom. 

49 



BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Buchan, History of the War (Nelson). 

Buxton, The War and the Balkans (Allen) . 

Chirol, Serbia and the Serbs (Oxford Pamphlets). 

'Diplomatist', Nationality and War in the Near East (Oxford). 

Forbes, Mitrany, and Toynbee, The Balkans (Oxford). 

Gibbons, The New Map of Europe (Century). 

Gibbons, The Reconstruction of Poland and the Near East (Century). 

Hogarth, The Near East (Oxford). 

Leeper, The Justice of Rumania's Cause (Doran). 

Marriott, The Eastern Question (Oxford). 

Mitrany, Rumania: Her History and Politics (Oxford Pamphlets). 

Seton-Watson, The Balkans, Italy and the Adriatic (Nisbet). 

Seton-Watson, The Southern Slav Question and the Hapsburg Monarchy 

(Constable). 
Taylor, The Future of the Southern Slavs (Dodd, Mead). 
Temperley, A History of Serbia (Bell). 
Toynbee, Nationality and the War (Dutton). 

Atlantic Monthly. 

Current History. 

New York Evening Post. 



XII. The Turkish portions of the present Ottoman Empire 
should he assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities 
which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted 
security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of 
autonomous development, and the Dardanelles shoidd be perma- 
nently opened as a free passage to the ships and commerce of all 
nations under international guarantees. 

See Toynbee, Turkey: A Past and Future (Doran) ; Urquhart, 
The Eastern Question (Oxford Pamphlets) ; Turkey in Europe 
and Asia (Oxford Pamphlets); Gibbons, The Reconstruction 
of Poland and the Near East (Century), Chaps. II and III. 

The Entente was officially pledged by the treaties with 
Russia (made public by the Bolsheviki; see The New York Evening 
Post, January, I9i8,and The New Europe, December, 1917) to 
drive Turkey out of Europe and to give Russia Constantinople. 
(See the reply of the Allies to Mr. Wilson's note, January, 
1 91 7). With the coming of the Russian revolution these im- 

50 



perialist aims were abandoned (see the speeches and docu- 
ments in Current History) and in his address of January 5, 
1918, Mr. Lloyd George declared: 

While we do not challenge the maintenance of the Turkish Empire 
in the homelands of the Turkish race with its capital at Constanti- 
nople, the passage between the Mediterranean and the Black Sea being 
internationalized and neutralized, Arabia, Armenia, Mesopotamia, 
Syria, and Palestine, are, in our judgment, entitled to a recognition of 
their separate national conditions. 

What would have been the probable attitude of the United 
States if Russia had continued to claim Constantinople? 

For the suggestion that the United States might undertake 
the administration of the Straits, see Toynbee, Nationality and 
the War (Dutton) ; Woolf, The Future of Constantinople (Allen 
& Unwin); and Buxton (Noel), 'The Destiny of the Turkish 
Straits', Contemporary Review, June, 191 7. For a history of 
previous attempts at international administration, see Woolf, 
International Government (Brentano), and for the interesting 
case of Shanghai, Moore, Digest of International Law (Govern- 
ment Printing Office), Vol II, p. 648/. 

On the whole problem of backward states see Lippmann, 
The Stakes of Diplomacy (Holt). 

BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Gibbons, The Reconstruction of Poland and the Near East (Century). 
Lippmann, The Stakes of Diplomacy (Holt). 
Toynbee, Nationality and the War (Dutton). 
Toynbee, Turkey: A Past and Future (Doran). 
Urquhart, The Eastern Question (Oxford Pamphlets). 

Turkey in Europe and Asia (Oxford Pamphlets). 
Woolf, The Future of Constantinople (Allen and Unwin). 

Contemporary Review. 

Current History. 

The New Europe. 

The New York Evening Post. 



XIII. An independent Polish state should be erected which 
should include the territories inhabited by indisputably Polish 
popidations, which should be assured a free and secure access 

51 



to the sea, and whose political and economic independence and 
territorial integrity should be guaranteed by international covenant. 

Illustrate from the case of the Poles the difficulties (a) 
strategic, (&) economic, (c) due to mixture of population, that 
may stand in the way of reconstructing a nationality as an 
independent state. 

Do the Poles look upon Prussia or Russia as the deadlier 
enemy? 

What conditions or compensations, short of extinction as a 
military power, would suffice to persuade Germany to give up 
the greater part of the Duchy of Posen to create an indepen- 
dent state or an autonomous unit within Russia? 

Would it be possible to give an independent Poland access 
to the sea without violating the principle of nationality? 

See Phillips, Poland (Holt: Home University Library); 
Gibbons, The Reconstruction of Poland and the Near East 
(Century); Lewinski-Corwin, The Political History of Poland 
(Polish Book Importing Co.) ; The War and Democracy (Mac- 
millan); Fayle, The Great Settlement (Duffield); Toynbee, 
Nationality and the War (Dutton) ; Ehrlich, Polatid, Prussia 
and Culture (Oxford Pamphlets); Rose, 'The Polish Problem: 
Past and Present', Contemporary Review, December, 1916. 



XIV. A general association of nations must be formed under 
specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees 
of political independence and territorial integrity to great and 
small states alike. 

A very full bibliography on a League of Nations will be 
found in Goldsmith, A League to Enforce Peace (Macmillan). 
This book, however, as has been said, does not attempt to 
apply the principles which it easily establishes in theory to 
the vexing problems of mid-European politics. The student, 
therefore, will find of more service the following books: 
Brailsford, A League of Nations (Macmillan); Woolf, Inter- 
national Government (Brentano) ; Woolf, The Framework of 
a Lasting Peace (Allen and Unwin) ; Hobson, Towards Inter- 
national Government (Macmillan) and Dickinson, The Choice 

52 



Before Us (Dodd, Mead). Many valuable articles have ap- 
peared in the reviews. Some of these have been reprinted by 
the World Peace Foundation and the League to Enforce Peace. 
Others that may be mentioned are Macdonell, 'Armed Paci- 
fism', Contemporary Review, March, 1917; Dickinson, 'A 
League of Nations and Its Critics', Contemporary Review, 
June, 1917. More elaborate outlines of proposed Leagues 
than the programme of the American organization are given 
by Mr. Brailsford and Mr. Woolf. 

How far is it true that America does not need a League to 
Enforce Peace for her own protection? 

Should a League of Nations be formed when the war ends 
or would it be better to wait until hatred between the belliger- 
ents has become less bitter? 

How far do you think the various war aims outlined by 
Mr. Wilson, Mr. Lloyd George, British Labor, Count Hert- 
ling, the Bolsheviki, etc., should be modified {a) if in the 
future there are no safeguards against aggression other than 
those existing when the war began, or (b) if there is mutual 
protection by a League of Nations? 

How far should sea-power be an instrument of a League of 
Nations? (See Norman Angell's The World's Highivay and 
the references given above under freedom of the seas.) 

How great is the danger that nations will make secret, re- 
insurance agreements with each other? Is a successful League 
of Nations dependent upon open diplomacy? 

To what extent must a League of Peace demand from its 
members adherence at all times, on pain of expulsion, or some 
other penalty, to certain fundamental principles, such as the 
principle of nationality and commercial freedom, including 
questions of tariffs at home and in the colonies, and guarantees 
for fair opportunities all round over questions of export of 
capital, access to raw materials, etc.? This question may be 
discussed in connection with the more general one: To what 
extent should a League of Peace aim simply at preventing 
the outbreak of actual wars, and how far might it venture 
to embark upon an attempt to remove the causes of mutual 
hostility among its members eventually to an open breach 
between them? 

53 



How far should Parliaments as well as Foreign Offices be 
represented on the International Bodies which are to function 
for the League of Nations? 

Germany is ready at all times to join a League of Nations and even 
to place herself at the head of a League which will restrain the dis- 
turber of peace. (Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg to the Com- 
mittee of the Reichstag, November 9, 1916.) 

What should be the attitude of a League of Nations towards 
the Central Powers? 

The following quotations are from Muir, 'The Difficulties 
of a League of Peace', The New Europe, February 1, 1917: 

I. The first and most obvious condition for the successful organi- 
zation of a League of Peace is that there must be no single power, or 
group of Powers, dominated by a single will, so strong as to be able to defy 
the rest of the world, and, therefore, to be tempted by the prospect of world- 
supremacy. 

Is this a valid condition? 

Would the British Commonwealth alone, or with the United 
States in a union of the English-speaking peoples, be strong 
enough to defy the rest of the world? 

Does this condition mean that Germany's "Mittel-Europa" 
scheme must be completely destroyed? 

II. The second preliminary condition of the organization of a 
League of Peace is that the political distribution of Europe and {as far 
as possible) of the whole world, must be drawn upon lines which promise 
permanence, by being based, not on the mere accidents of conquest 
or dynastic inheritance, but on clear and defensible principles, on 
reason, and on justice. 

Is this condition valid? 

Should a League of Nations guarantee the status quo (a) 
except as altered by peaceful agreement? or (b) except as 
altered by international council? See the books by Woolf 
cited above and Phillips, The Confederation of Europe (Long- 
mans) which discusses the Holy Alliance and is not hopeful 
of the success of a League of Nations. 

III. Suppose these preliminary conditions to be satisfactorily met, 
we are faced at the outset by a difficulty which affects the membership 
of the League. If the nations are to have confidence in it as a means 

54 



of preserving peace, it must include no States which cannot be trusted to 
fulfill the responsibilities of membership. Every State must have reason- 
able ground for certainty that, if it is attacked or if any of the principles 
of international law are infringed, all the other members of the league 
will take such active steps as may be required by the league's consti- 
tution. 

Is this condition valid? (See the suggestions and questions 
above under B. and D. and Norman Angell's War Aims: The 
Need for a Parliament of the Allies [Headley].) 

Would it be safe to include in the League a government 
like the United States where the treaty-making authority 
cannot commit the country to war as a means of coercing a 
recalcitrant state? 

Would the danger be greater than in England where the 
Parliament, although having no formal control over foreign 
policy, holds the purse strings? 

IV. Assuming that some sort of League of Peace is to be established, 
we are next brought up against the difficulty of devising for it a system 
of direction. Not long since I listened to a lecture by an eminent 
lawyer, 1 in which he commended the idea of the league as a sure safe- 
guard against war, and proved, to his own satisfaction, that, if such a 
league had existed in 1914, the present war would not have broken 
out; and, indeed, we may very readily agree that if the conditions 
which would make a League of Peace a practical proposal had existed 
in 1914 there would have been no war. Having said so much, the 
lecturer went on to observe : "Of course, the league must have a com- 
mon executive and a general staff;" and, saying that, he passed on to 
other topics, as it the establishment of a common executive and a 
general staff presented no difficulties at all. Now it is plain that the 
constitution of the league must depend upon the character of its 
component members. If they trust and understand one another, its 
system may be simple and unelaborate. But if, as seems to be assumed 
by many of its advocates, it is to include all the civilized States of the 
world, it will require a very carefully-worked-out system of adminis- 
tration: a sort of federal council of civilization. 

Is this difficulty insurmountable? 

How is it w r orked out in the schemes suggested by Mr. 
Woolf and Mr. Brailsford? 

\Sir Frederick Pollock, whose lecture was partly published in the Fortnightly Review, 
December, 1916. 

55 



With what chances of success? 

V. If or when the war ends with victory of the Allied Powers, the 
conditions essential for the existence of a League of Peace, as we have 
already defined them, will have been largely secured. But not only 
that; there will exist, in fact, a great League of Peace consisting of 
ten States, which will have held together as no alliance has ever held 
together before in history, which will have learnt to trust and under- 
stand one another, and which will be united in the resolve to prevent 
the recurrence of such a catastrophe. If they win their victory, they 
will be strong enough to secure peace for the future. They will include 
five of the seven great States of the world — the British Empire, France, 
Italy, Russia, and Japan — and five of the lesser States of Europe, some 
of which — notably Rumania and Serbia — will be much more powerful 
than they have ever been before. This group of States will be pro- 
foundly distrustful of their defeated foes, whose treacheries have 
caused them so much agony; and in order to guard against any future 
recrudescence of the danger, they will be anxious to maintain their 
well-tried and friendly cooperation, and to devise means for preventing 
any cleavage among them, such as might encourage their defeated 
enemy to raise his head again and revive his malign ambitions. 

What forms will this cooperation take? 

BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Angell, The World' s Highway (Doran). 

Angell, War Aims: The Need for a Parliament of the Allies (Headley). 

Brailsford, A League of Nations (Macmillan). 

Dickinson, The Choice Before Us (Dodd, Mead). 

Goldsmith, A League to Enforce Peace (Macmillan). 

Hobson, Towards International Government (Macmillan). 

Phillips, The Confederation of Europe (Longmans). 

Woolf, International Government (Brentano). 

Woolf, The Framework of a Lasting Peace (Allen and Unwin). 

Contemporary Review. 
The New Europe. 
The New Republic. 
The Nation (London). 



56 



